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THE INFLUENCE OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 





Evidence on teacher behavior is essential for the understanding of the performance of school 
systems. In this paper we utilize rich data to study the teachers’ quit decision in Norway. We 
distinguish between decisions to move between public schools within school districts, to 
another school district in the same labor market region, across labor market regions, and 
whether to leave public schools. The results indicate that the quit propensity to all four 
destinations is negatively related to student performance. The result is qualitatively 
independent of whether student performance is measured by exam results or teacher 
graduation. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent literature clearly confirms the common sense that teachers are important for 
student achievement, see Hanushek (2002) and Rockoff (2004). Evidence on teacher behavior 
and the functioning of the teacher labor market is thus essential for the understanding of 
school performance. Both the choices of talented people on whether to go into teaching or 
not, the decisions of staying or leaving teaching, and the allocation of teachers across schools 
are important for individual students. The occupational choices are important for the overall 
efficiency of the school system, while the allocation of teachers across schools is merely a 
distributional question. If the best teachers are matched with high performing students and the 
poorest teachers are matched with low performing students, the school system may boost the 
inequalities in society instead of contributing to equal opportunities as intended. 
The outcome in the teacher labor market depends on the behavior of several actors. 
The decision-making of both political institutions and the schools (school boards and school 
principals), the power of teacher unions, and the behavior of teachers and students contribute 
to the final outcome. At the most basic level, teacher quality is determined by teacher supply 
and teacher demand as highlighted by Bonesrønning et al. (2005). Under reasonable 
assumptions they are able to separately identify teacher supply and demand. However, the 
measure of teacher quality that follows from their approach is only one aspect of a multi-
dimensional concept. Because the overall outcome is a result of complex interactions, 
confining empirical analyses to specific aspects of the teacher labor market is useful to the 
extent that the results from such restricted studies reflect general mechanisms.  
The teacher decision to stay or leave teaching at a particular school is perhaps the most 
studied aspect of the teacher labor market. It is attractive from an econometric point of view 
because at least voluntary quits must be seen as an outcome merely of decisions of individual 
teachers. In addition, it is reasonable to believe that schools for which teachers tend to quit are 
unattractive for some reason. Determinants of quit decisions are therefore likely to indicate 
which factors that influence the general attractiveness of schools. 
The effect of student achievement on teacher behavior is of particular importance 
because it has implications for the equity enhancing possibilities of the school system. If 
teachers flee low performing schools, teacher quality is likely to be lowest for the students 
most in need of a good school. Hanushek et al. (2004) find that school districts serving 
academically disadvantaged students have difficulties retaining teachers, while Scafidi et al. 
(2003) find no effects of student achievement on the teachers’ quit decision. In the present 
paper we study quit decisions at lower secondary schools in Norway. The main achievement   2
data used are the results on an external exam that each student has to undertake at the end of 
the lower secondary school (10th grade). This is a high stake test because the results influence 
the choice set for upper secondary education, undertaken by above 95 percent of the students. 
In addition we also investigate the effect of the teacher grading of the students, which cover 
several subjects, but may be due to different assessments across teachers and schools. 
Existing studies of teacher moves can be divided into three groups. The first group is 
based on survey data and consists of papers concerned with teachers leaving teaching and 
focus mainly on the effects of wages and family status (e.g., Murnane and Olsen, 1989, 
Dolton and van der Klaauw, 1995, Stinebrickner, 2001). The second group of studies focuses 
on teachers leaving the school district (e.g., Gritz and Theobald, 1996, Mont and Rees, 1996, 
Imazeki, 2002, Hanushek et al., 2004). This research indicates that school district 
characteristics such as class load and student composition influence the teachers’ decisions. 
But because such studies typically are based on register data, they typically do not condition 
on the family status of the teachers.  A small number of papers are able to distinguish between 
transitions within and between school districts (Greenberg and McCall, 1974, Falch and 
Strøm, 2005, Scafidi et al., 2003). This may be an important aspect because recent evidence 
indicates that the variation in teacher quality across schools within school districts may be 
larger than the variation between districts (Lankford et al., 2002, Bonesrønning et al., 2005). 
In this paper we distinguish between moves between public schools within school 
districts, to a public school in another school district in the same labor market region, across 
labor market regions, and whether to leave public schools. The different types of moves are 
likely to be affected by different factors. Separating out moves within school districts, which 
may react stronger to student composition and student performance than other types of moves, 
may be more appealing in the Norwegian institutional setting than in the US institutional 
setting. In the US the teachers are formally linked to the school districts and can to some 
extent be instructed to switch schools within the school district, while in Norway the teachers 
are linked to the schools. The transition observed in the US may be a result of both teacher 
preferences and the preferences of the school district. In Norway the teachers can only be 
replaced against their will if there is a serious drop in the number of students at their 
particular schools (as a closure of the school). Thus, the transitions observed are voluntary 
quits with only very few exceptions.  
Further, we are able to utilize extremely rich data on teachers and schools. The 
employer data on teachers includes information on their wage, experience, and appointment 
status. This data are merged with register data on family structure, as marital status and   3
fertility, and school data including a variety of information of the schools and the students. 
The combination of very rich description of the teachers and the schools makes this data set 
unique. The sample is restricted to the school years 1998-99 to 2001-02 due to availability of 
student performance data, and we further restrict the sample to teachers with permanent 
appointment to focus on voluntary quits. 
The next section set out a simple framework to think about how determinants of 
teacher quits are likely to be related to determinants of teacher quality. The data used are 
presented in Section 3, and the empirical results are provided in Section 4. Section 5 contains 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical approach 
Teacher quality must at some level be related to teacher supply. If no teachers are 
willing to work at a school, thinking about teacher quality is meaningless. On the other hand, 
schools faced with an extremely high supply should obviously be able to obtain a high teacher 
quality. Thus, our starting point is that teacher quality is positively related to teacher supply. 
There exist very few empirical analyses of the labor supply faced by individual schools or 
firms.
1 The main problem with studies of this kind is that one typically does not have good 
instruments for wages. Thus, it is attractive to study individual behavior because wages can 
more reasonable be considered as exogenous at the individual level.  
For a school, changes in individual’s ranking of the school compared to other potential 
employers may be seen as a change in the teacher supply directed towards the school. To 
formalize, decompose the supply S faced by a school into the current incumbent teachers T, 
new hires H, and teachers who want to work at the school but who are not offered a post M. 
ThenSTHM =++ . The change in teacher supply, say from the start of the previous school 
year t-1 to the start of the present school year t can then be defined as 
t1 t ST H M H q m h − ∆= ∆− + ∆ + = −+ +,   (1) 
where  ∆ is a differential operator. The number of quits  t1 qT H − = −∆ +  is defined as the 
number of incumbent teachers the previous school year (Tt-1 + Ht-1) minus the number of 
incumbent teachers at the start of the present school year (Tt).  mM = ∆  is the change in the 
potential and unrealized school-teacher matches, and h is the number of new matches (Ht). 
From (1) it follows that both analyzes of the matching of teachers and schools and the quit 
                                                 
1 The exceptions are some studies of the labor market for nurses (Sullivan, 1989, Staiger et al., 1999.) and some 
studies of teacher supply (Currie, 1991, Falch, 2003, Bonesrønning et al., 2005).    4
behavior of existing teachers may be seen as analyses related to the change in teacher supply. 
If the quit rate increases for some reason, hires must increase correspondingly, presumably 
reducing the average quality of the new matches, but certainly reducing the number of 
potential but unrealized matches. 
School characteristics may of course have different quantitative effects on turnover 
decisions and matching processes. In particular, features of the first match for a newly 
educated teacher will influence their later turnover decisions. If attractive schools prefer 
teachers with high experience and good references, young teachers must start their career in 
less appealing schools and work their way up to more appealing schools. Then quit decisions 
will be more sensitive to school characteristics than the initial match. On the other hand, if all 
matches are based on perfect information about the teachers and the present situation at the 
schools, turnover will only be related to changes in school characteristics.  
Analyzing the matching process is complicated by the fact that one only observes 
actual matches and not potential matches.
2 Determinants of the quit decisions of existing 
teachers are therefore easier to analyze because all quits can in principle be observed. In the 
following, we will argue that the matching and quitting processes are likely to be influenced 
by the same factors. If a school turns less attractive, it will both increase the quit propensity of 
its initial teachers and make the school less appealing for new teachers. Teachers, like other 
workers, prefer more pleasant working conditions to less pleasant ones. 
Let the utility of working in a particular school depends on the wage W and non-
pecuniary rewards N. Then the lifetime utility from time t on for teacher i working in school j 
can be written 
() ( )
ii i
jt jt jt jt 1 Uu W , N E U + =+ δ ,   (2) 
where δ is a discount factor and E is an expectational operator. School j is in the choice set J, 
where J includes schools, other jobs, and being out of the labor force. Then the teacher will 
prefer another state if 
() () () ( ) { }
ii i i i max
jt jt jt 1 kt kt kt 1 kJ , kj uW , N E U uW , N E U c ++ ∈≠ +δ < +δ − ,     (3)  
where c
i is the moving cost. Teacher i will prefer to quit school j if she is offered a job in k. 
Assuming that  () ()
ii
jt 1 kt 1 EU EU ++ = , that is, the job today do not affect the opportunities in the 
future, (3) can be written 
                                                 
2 To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical study of two-sided match in the market for teachers is Boyd et 
al. (2003). By utilize the method of simulated moments they model the interaction between schools and teachers 
in a game-like fashion.   5
() ()
ii i max
jt jt kt kt kJ , kj uW , N uW , N c
∈≠  <−     (4) 
If Wjt or Njt increases, there will exists fewer alternatives that yield a higher utility level than 
staying at school j, which decreases the probability of being offered a job preferable to staying 
at school j. When the probability that teachers at school j have a better alternative decreases, 
less teachers quits, and q decreases. For teachers not working at school j, the rise in Wj or Nj 
increases the probability that school j is preferable compared to their present position, which 
increases m in (1).
3 Within this set-up, each factor that makes a school more attractive will 
both reduce the quit propensities of incumbent teachers and increase the number of applicants 
to vacant teacher posts.  
In the dynamic framework of Burdett (1978), with incomplete information and costly 
job search, the search intensity depends on the present utility level. Burdett (1978) shows that 
higher wages reduce the quit propensity of workers, both because the probability of being 
offered a higher wage than the present wage is reduced and because it is optimal to reduce the 
search intensity in this case. At the same time, a vacant position is more likely to be matched 
with a worker preferring this job over her alternatives when the wage increases because fewer 
will reject a job offer. Thus, a rise in the wage will both decrease the quit propensity of 
existing workers and increase the match propensity of new workers.  
The teacher labor market is characterized by a rigid wage. In the US the wage vary 
very little within school districts, while in many European countries as the UK, Germany, 
France and Norway, there are almost no national variation in the wage. In the framework 
above, non-pecuniary rewards N then have an important impact on teachers’ preference 
ranking of the schools. In the analysis below, we will include a range of different measures 
that can influence the attractiveness of the work environment at different schools. For 
example, it is expected to be more pleasant to teach well-performing students than poor 
performing students.  
The family status, as for example presence of school-aged children, is likely to be 
important for the moving costs, in particular for moves that require a residential change. In 
addition, the valuation of non-pecuniary aspects may depend on teacher characteristics as 
indicated by the formulation above.  
Besley and Ghatak (2003, 2005) argue that the effort agents provide in public 
organizations depend on their valuation of the output produced. Thus, the mission of the 
teachers relative to the mission of the schools, deciding teachers’ valuation of the output, 
                                                 
3 In addition, m will increase because a lower quit rate reduces new hires.   6
affects the degree of effort teachers are willing to provide, and quit decisions observed is 
related to mismatch of teachers and schools. Within a relatively centralized public school 
system, we do not believe the missions of the schools vary nearly as much as the motivation 
of the teachers. The dedication to serve low-performing students is likely to vary across 
teachers to a larger extent than across schools. However, teachers leaving a school must be 
replaced, and systematically high hiring rates are likely to make it hard to achieve high 
teacher quality because, within the framework above, m is likely to be low. Nevertheless, 
when attempting to single out the quits that are important for teacher quality, it may be 
important to include in the model a detailed set of teacher characteristics that may account for 
differences in mission. 
 
3. Data and econometric specification 
The utilization of several data sources makes the data abounding in information about 
the individual teachers and schools. We use employer register data, collected by the Ministry 
of Labor and Government Administration, covering all Norwegian teachers in public schools.
4 
The data include, e.g., information on wages, experience and appointment status. These data 
are merged with individual information from Statistics Norway, including family 
characteristics as fertility and marital status, and region of birth. Further, this sample is 
combined with school data collected by the Ministry of Education (Grunnskolens 
Informasjonssystem) as well as recently available student test-scores from the Norwegian 
Board of Education. The achievement data available are the results at the end of the lower 
secondary school (10th grade) for the school years 1999-2000 to 2001-02. Finally, as 
remaining controls, we use regional data from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services.  
 Because we focus on the effect of student achievement at the end of the 10th grade, 
the sample is reduced to teachers working at schools including this level. About half of these 
schools are combined primary and lower secondary schools (1st to 10th grade), the rest is 
pure lower secondary schools (8th to 10th grade). Since only voluntary quits are of interest, 
only teachers with permanent appointments are included in the sample, excluding teachers on 
                                                 
4 In the school year 2000-01, 1.7 percent of the students at primary and lower secondary schools were enrolled in 
private (mostly religious) schools. Teachers at those schools are not included in our sample.   7
short term contracts.
5 In addition, in order to avoid retirement decisions, teachers over 60 
years of age are excluded from the sample.  
Mobility both to a primary, lower secondary and upper secondary schools (11
th to 13
th 
grade) are identified. In the baseline empirical model we will distinguish between four types 
of teacher mobility: moves to another public school in the same school district,
6 moves to a 
public school in another school district in the same labor market region, moves to a public 
school in another labor market region, and moves out of the public school sector.
7 The 
comparison group is teachers that do not move at all. The local labor market regions used are 
defined by Statistics Norway. Based on commuting statistics, they identify 90 labor markets, 
covering on average 4.8 school districts. Table 1 gives a brief summary of the teachers’ 
moving pattern.  
 
Table 1. Teacher turnover 1998-99 to 2001-02 in percent 
  1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01  2001-02 1998-2002 
Do not quit at all 
 
89.33 88.95 90.06 91.16 89.88 
Moving to a school in the same school district
 
3.12 3.18 2.66 2.41 2.84 
Moving to a school in another school district 
in the same labor market region 
0.67 0.78 0.56 0.39 0.60 
Moving to a school in another labor market 
region 
1.56 1.58 1.36 1.09 1.40 
Moving out of public schools 
 
5.31 5.50 5.36 4.95 5.28 
Total mobility 
 
10.66 11.04  9.94  8.84  10.12 




On average over the school years 1998-99 to 2001-02, about 90 percent of the teachers 
do not quit at all. Most of the teachers that quit leave the public school sector, while moves to 
another school district within the same labor market region only includes 0.6 percent of the 
                                                 
5 Teachers at schools that are not in the data the next school year (school closures) are removed from the sample. 
Due to increased overall teacher employment during the empirical period, there exists extremely few other cases 
where teachers are instructed to leave their initial school. 
6 In Norway, primary and lower secondary education is the responsibility of the municipalities. The 
municipalities are multipurpose institutions with the responsibility for care for the elderly, daycare, 
infrastructure, etc. Spending on primary and lower secondary education accounts for about 30 percent of total 
municipal spending. 
7 Teachers who are not in the data the next school year are defined as movers out of public schools. Teachers on 
paid leave (mostly maternity leave) are considered as stayers.    8
teachers. The quit propensity increased slightly from 1998-99 to 1999-2000, and decreased 
markedly thereafter to 8.8 percent in the school year 2001-02.  
We expect the effect of school characteristics, as for example student achievement, to 
be strongest for moves within school districts and smallest for moves to another school 
district in the same local labor market. The latter type of moves are expected to be mainly 
motivated by reduced commuting time, while the former types of moves to a greater extent 
may be due to searches for the “best” school within a reasonable commuting space. 
 
3.1 Baseline model 
The econometric specification relates school and teacher characteristics to teacher 
moving pattern. The empirical analysis is based on the traditional multinomial logistic 

















   (5) 
where the dependent variable move includes the five destinations described above for teacher i 
in school s in region r at time t. The vector of independent variables Y includes variables at 
the individual, school, and regional levels.  
 
Test scores 
Student achievement is expected to influence the teachers’ required effort and their 
general well-being positively. Increased student achievement may make the work more 
pleasant, improving the non-pecuniary rewards.  
At grades 8 to 10, the students are graded by their teachers. At the end of the 10th 
grade, the students must undertake an external examination. Both the exam results and the 
grading of the teachers matter for further schooling possibilities. Although all students have 
the right to continue at upper secondary schools (see Falch, 2002), and above 95 percent do 
continue, their choice set among different schools and different study tracks depends on their 
achievement in lower secondary schools. In this regard, the exam is clearly a high stake test 
for the students. In this paper we mainly focus on the exam results because they are set by 
external examiners. 
 The curriculum consists of a lot of different subjects, some of them are compulsory 
while others are elective. Written examination is only undertaken in the three main subjects;   9
mathematics, English and Norwegian.
8 However, most commonly each student only 
participates in one of these exams, decided centrally shortly before the exam. Often all 
students at a school have their exam in the same subject. Thus, in our analysis we will use the 
mean performance across these subjects.  
    In the grading 6 is top score, while 1 is fail. The distribution of the grades in 
mathematics one particular school year is presented in Figure 1. The grading is reasonable 
normally distributed.  For the other subjects, the distribution is very similar.
9 Nevertheless, 
when calculating weighted average achievement at the schools, we use standardized results 
for each subject in each year (mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to unity).
10  
In sensitivity analyses, we replace this achievement measure by the grading of the 
teachers in the same subjects. One advantage of using teacher grading is that all students are 
graded in all three subjects. In addition, we test the effect of the share of low-performing 
students, defined as the share of students with grade 1 or 2.
11 
 
Figure 1. The distribution of examination grades in mathematics in 1999-2000 





















                                                 
8 Norwegian includes two separate exams in the two official written languages in Norway.  
9 For example, in the school year 2001-02, the mean result was 3.55 (0.53), 3.48 (0.60), 3.59 (0.59) and 3.39 
(0.70) in mathematics, English and the two exams in Norwegian, respectively. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. 
10 The correlation coefficient between average standardized achievement and the average of the exam grading 
(non-standardized) is 0.92.  
11 The correlation coefficient between the average of the standardized exam results and the grades given by 
teachers is 0.54. The correlation coefficient between the average of standardized exam results and the share of 
low performing students at the exam is -0.78.   10
    The test score used in the analysis is related to the students finishing their lower 
secondary education. But if teachers are forward looking, they should be interested in the 
ability of the students at school the next school years. Current achievement of the 10
th graders 
may be an imprecise measure of the ability of interest for the teacher decisions, which should 
bias the estimate against zero as with classical measurement error. In order to shed more light 
on this issue, we will also present results using leaded and lagged achievement instead of 
current achievement.  
 
Other school characteristics 
  To control for other conditions with the particular school that might influence teacher 
turnover we include several additional school characteristics. The main role of the school 
district is to decide the budgets of the schools. As a measure of the resource use we include 
total teacher education hours per student, which a slightly more detailed measure than the 
teacher-student ratio. Teacher education hours is the amount of time teachers interact with 
students, and is not perfectly correlated with teacher man-years because the work load varies 
between subjects and depends on the amount of non-teaching tasks. The common assumption 
is that increased resource use improves the working conditions and reduces teacher quits, 
although the findings in the literature are mixed (Hanushek et al., 2004, Falch and Strøm, 
2005). 
  Student composition is characterized by measures of students with special needs and 
minority students. There has been increasing interest in the role of such characteristics for 
teachers’ decision on which school to attend, see, e.g., Gritz and Theobald (1996), Scafidi et 
al. (2003), Hanushek et al. (2004) and Falch and Strøm (2005). Our detailed school data 
makes it possible to separate between quantity and severity of the student composition. As 
measures on quantity we include the share of students with special needs and the share of 
minority students. The severity of, for example, students with special needs is measured 
utilizing the accounting of resource use at schools. The total teaching education hours at each 
school consist of a baseline nationally determined minimum plus additional hours to specific 
purposes.
12 The additional hours at least partly reflects the needs of the student population, 
and both the variables additional teacher education hours for student with special needs per 
student with special needs and additional teacher education hour for minority students per 
                                                 
12 According to the school act, extra resources have to be allocated to students with special needs based on 
individual education plans to be designed in an interaction between teachers, parents, specialists on disabled 
students, and the local government. The amount of extra resources entitled to each student shall be determined 
by their needs.  A similar rule is in place for minority students.   11
minority student are included in the analysis. Information on family background of the 10
th 
graders is available from the school year 2001-02 only, and we utilize this information in 
some robustness checks. 
  In addition to the student body composition, we also include the share of non-certified 
teachers at school as a measure of the composition of the teachers.
13 We expect a positive 
effect of this variable because teachers may prefer to work with colleagues with the same 
education background, but this variable may also pick up the effect of some missing variables 
on school attractiveness.    
  A teacher may also regard the school size when she considers the quit decision. 
Because of large variation in the Norwegian settlement pattern there is a huge difference 
between the smallest and largest schools. We include the logarithm of the number of pupils at 
level and squared form in the model to capture nonlinear effects. In addition, whether there 
are students at the primary level at school (combined schools) is included as a control variable 
in the model. 
  Table 2 presents correlation coefficients between average student achievement and 
some of the school characteristics. The correlations between the test scores and the share of 
minority students and the share students with special needs are negative. The variables 
capturing the severity of the student composition, school size and whether there exist classes 
at the primary level at the school seems to be uncorrelated with the student achievement  
 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients between standardized exam results and different school 
characteristics 
Share of students with special needs  -0.13 
Additional teacher education hours for special needs 
students per student with special needs   0.02 
Share of minority students  -0.14 
Additional teacher education hours for minority students per 
minority student  -0.02 
Log of number of pupils  0.03 




                                                 
13 There is a national rule saying that non-certified teachers, that is, teachers without formal teacher education, 
can only be appointed as a teacher if no certified teachers are willing to accept the job. Further, non-certified 
teachers can only be appointed on one-year contracts, see Bonesrønning et al. (2005) for details.    12
Individual characteristics 
As discussed in Section 2, teacher turnover is likely to depend on individual mobility 
costs, and the valuation of different school properties might differ between teachers. Hence it 
seems important to include relevant teacher characteristics in the model to reveal truthful 
estimates of the variable of interest. A general hypothesis is that as more settled a teacher is, 
the higher is the mobility cost. To capture this notion, we include several teacher 
characteristics.  
The number of school aged children (6-18 years of age) are expected to increase 
mobility costs, while the number of children below six years of age may hasten mobility 
because the mobility costs increases when the children starts at school. Married teachers are 
likely to have higher mobility costs than divorced and never-married teachers, and mobility 
costs probably increase with age. In addition, proximity to place of childhood may be 
important for the quit behavior. The evidence in Boyd et al. (2005) strongly suggests that 
teachers prefer to work close to where they grew up. We have information on which school 
district teachers are born and where they lived at age ten.  Since the local labor market regions 
typically cover several school districts, we construct a dummy variable for whether the 
teacher is born in the same local labor market as she is working. Since there are some missing 
observations for this variable, we also include a dummy variable for whether the birth region 
is unknown.
14   
Stinebrickner (1998) finds that women are more likely to leave teaching than men. To 
control for the possibility that female teachers might have a different quit behavior than male 
teachers we include a dummy variable for gender. In addition, we include a dummy variable 
for whether the teacher is on leave with pay, mostly maternity leaves, and a dummy variable 
for whether the teacher is working part time. Teachers have three to six years of higher 
education (colleges and universities). Dummy variables for educational level are included.  
In standard utility theory, increased salary has a negative effect on turnover. However, 
up to the school year 2000-01, the Norwegian teacher wage was completely determined by 
national bargains between the teacher union and the central government, and was solely 
determined by the amount of formal education (included in the model) and experience (in a 
nonlinear way). Because there have been some limited local flexibility in the later years, we 
include the log of the teacher wage (corrected for working time) in the model, but with the 
caution that this variable may pick up other aspects of the quitting behavior as long as the 
                                                 
14 When the birth region is unknown, it is replaced by the region where the teacher lived at age ten. For about 10 
percent of the observations, both the school district of birth and at age 10 are missing.    13
factors determining the wage level are not fully controlled for. Anyway, the prediction is a 
negative effect in accordance with the findings in for example Murnane and Olsen (1989), 
Dolton and van der Klaauw (1995, 1999), and Imazeki (2002).  
 
Regional characteristics 
Finally we utilize regional data to create variables at the school district level that may 
influence the teacher behavior. That is the unemployment rate, the share of immigrants, the 
share of divorced people, population size, and a measure of the settlement-pattern. In 
particular high unemployment rate are expected to have a negative effect on the probability to 
leave teaching, and population size are expected to have a positive effect on within school 
districts move because the choice set of schools for the teachers increases. In addition, a full 
set of dummy variables for labor market region is included. Among other things, this control 
for different choice sets for teachers in different regions. In essence, the analysis then allows 
for different behaviors of teachers currently working in schools with similar student 
achievement, but where the schools are located in regions where the student achievement in 
the neighboring schools differs. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented in Appendix 
Table A1 for the sample used in the baseline model. For the baseline model, covering the 
school years 1998-99 to 2000-01, there are 60,485 observations of 25,363 teachers in 1,062 
schools. The average age of the teachers is 45 years, 70 percent is married, they have on 
average 0.66 school aged children, and only 37 percent is working in the same labor market 
region as born. 
 
4. Estimation results 
The estimation results for the school characteristics are reported in Table 3, while the 
effects of the other variables in the model are reported in Appendix Table 2. The effects of 
teacher characteristics are mainly as expected. For example, the quit propensity is generally 
negatively related to age, the number of school aged children and whether the teacher live in 
the birth region. For the latter two variables, there are strong effects on leaving the local labor 
market and none effects on within school districts moves. Divorced teachers have in general a 
higher quit propensity than single teachers who have never been married, while married 
teachers and female teachers have a lower propensity to quit for a school in another labor 
market as well as out of the education sector. Regarding moves out of the education sector,   14
there is a positive effect of working part time, and negative effects of having higher education 
of medium length (4 or 5 years) and the salary.
15 Regarding the variables at the school district 
level, all effects of unemployment and population size are negative except for within school 
district moves.  
Student performance seems to have a negative effect on teacher turnover. The effect is 
negative and significant at least at 10 percent level for all types of moves identified. Evaluated 
at predicted quitting probabilities for mean values of the independent variables, an increase of 
one unit in student achievement (about 1.5 standard deviations) decreases the probability to 
move to another school in the same school district, to another school district in the same labor 
market region, across labor market regions, and to leave public schools by 0.31, 0.17, 0.28 
and 0.26 percentage points, respectively. In total, the marginal reduction in quitting 
propensity is 1.02 percentage points, which is a significant amount compared to the mean 
quitting propensity of about ten percent. The results are in line with Hanushek et al. (2004), 
but contradicts the findings by Scafidi et al. (2003) who conclude that students’ test scores do 
not play an important role in the teachers’ decision whether or not to leave the initial school.  
The strong effect on mobility to schools in another labor market region indicates that 
teachers not only search for a good match for given residence, but residential change is also 
related to student performance. If one is dissatisfied with the current working conditions, and 
thereby wants to shift working place, the results indicate that both the willingness to change 
residence and the willingness to leave public schools increase. Notice that all effects are 
conditional on dummy variables for regional labor markets. The results must therefore be 
interpreted as the effect of relative achievement compared to other schools in the same labor 
market region.  
 
                                                 
15 The salary is mainly decided by experience and education in a nonlinear and interacting way. The salary is 
included instead of including these variables in a very flexible form, also recognizing that there is some local 
discretion on the salary from 2000-01 and onwards. The negative and significant effect on moves out of public 
schools is pretty strong. This may indicate that the least experienced and least educated teachers are most likely 
to leave public schools, but may also be a direct effect of the wage level.   15
Table 3. The baseline model. The comparison group is staying teachers.  
  Moving to a school 
in the same school 
district. 
Moving to a school in 
another school district 
in the same labor 
market region. 
Moving to a school 
in another labor 
market region. 
Moving out of 
public  schools 
Student performance       















Other school characteristics         














Additional teacher education hours 
for special needs students per student 




























Additional teacher education hours 












































Logarithm to total number of teacher 














The share of uncertified teachers 
employed at school 
 
 



























        
Predicted probability  0.03  0.006     0.013  0.05 
Note. 60485 observations. The model is estimated by the multinomial logit method. Asymptotic t-values in 
parentheses, calculated based on standard errors corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors, and 
marginal effects in percentage points in brackets. * and ** denotes significance at ten and five percent level 
respectively. In addition to the reported variables, the variables reported in Appendix Table A2, labor market 
region specific effects and year specific effects are included in the model.  
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The effects of the other school characteristics are merely insignificant. The student 
composition, the share of students with special needs and the share of minority students and 
the amount of extra resources directed to this students, turn out to have small effects. This 
contradicts the findings in, for example, Falch and Strøm (2005), Scafidi et al. (2003) and 
Hanushek et al. (2004), who all find that teachers tend to leave schools with a high share of 
minority or black students.
16  Regarding school size, the log of the number of pupils has a U-
shaped effect on teacher turnover, although only significant for within district moves. 
Resource use has also in general small effects, see Falch and Strøm (2005) for a discussion of 
this result. Regarding the share of uncertified teachers at school, there are positive effects on 
moves to a school in another labor market region and out of public schools, which must be 
interpreted as the effect of the relative share of uncertified teacher employed compared to 
other schools in the same labor market region.  
In the next sections we change the baseline model specification in different ways to 
investigate the robustness of the effect of student achievement.  
 
4.1 Alternative measures on student achievement 
In this section we replace the measure of student achievement used in the baseline 
model above with several different alternative measures, including lagged and leaded values 
of the examination grades, grades given by teachers, and the share of low performing students 
The present value of student achievement is related to the students finishing their 
lower secondary education. But if teachers are forward looking, they should be interested in 
the ability of the students at school the next school year(s). Empirically this does not need to 
be important if the test scores are reasonable constant over time. Table 4 shows that the 
within-school correlations between the exam results for the students at 10th grade in various 
years are in the range 0.30–0.35. This implies that there are important changes in student 
achievement at a particular school over time. Using leaded achievement of the 10th graders in 
the model may then be attractive because this characterizes the students that will be at the 
school the next school year. On the other hand, leaded achievement may depend on whether 
specific teachers choose to stay or leave the school today. If it is expected that poor students 
                                                 
16 The divergent results compared to earlier Norwegian studies (Falch and Strøm, 2005) seem mainly to be 
driven by different samples used. Our sample covers the years 1999-2000 to 2001-02, while Falch and Strøm 
investigated teacher moving pattern over a 7-years-period from 1992-93 to 1998-99, including both primary and 
lower secondary schools. The effects of the share of minority students and students with special needs in our 
model are independent of whether student achievement is included in the model or not, or whether the different 
measures of teacher education hours are included in the model or not. However, excluding all family 
characteristics (which is not included in Falch and Strøm) increases the effects in expected direction somewhat.   17
will be at the school the next year, and the most qualified teachers react strongest to this 
expectations because they have more alternatives than other teachers, the estimated effect by 
using leaded achievement will be biased away from zero compared to the true effect. This 
mechanism is less relevant by using present and lagged values. Instead, present achievement, 
and to a greater extent lagged achievement, may be an imprecise indicator of the ability of the 
students the next year, which should bias the estimate of these measures against zero as with 
classical measurement error. 
 
Table 4. Correlation across school years in average standardized exam results, weighted 
by the number of observations 
  1999-2000 2000-01  2001-02 
1999-2000  1    
2000-01  0.35 1   
2001-02  0.30 0.30 1 
 
 
The results for separate regressions are reported in Table 5. Overall there are negative 
effects on all types of moves for both leaded, present and lagged measures of student 
achievement. In all cases there is a significant effect on within school district moves. 
Regarding the other types of moves, the effect varies to some extent across the specifications. 
There is no effect of lagged achievement, while the effect of leaded achievement is only 
significant for moves to another labor market region. The differences in the estimated 
coefficients must be related to the fact that the correlation over time in achievement is not 
overwhelming. In addition, there are also different samples used in the different 
specifications. When lagged achievement is used, the school year 2001-02 is excluded from 
the analysis (reducing the sample by 1/3), while when leaded achievement is used, the sample 
consists of the school years 1998-99 through 2000-01.  
Turning to the share of low-performing students, there are positive effects of this 
variable on the propensity for all types of quits of about the same order as for average 
achievement For example, when the share of low-performing students decreases by 0.16 
(about 1.5 standard deviations), the probability to move to another school in the same school 
districts and out of public schools increase with about 0.22 and 0.27 percentage points, 
respectively. The effect on within school district moves is only marginally significant at 10   18




Table 5. The effects of alternative measures on student performance. The comparison 
group is staying teachers 
  Moving to a school 
in the same school 
district. 
Moving to a school in 
another school district 
in the same labor 
market region. 
Moving to a school 
in another labor 
market region. 
Moving out of 
public  schools 
       
Examination grades 
 
     






















































Grades given by teachers 
     

























































Note. The models are estimated by the multinomial logit method. Asymptotic t-values in parentheses, calculated 
based on standard errors corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors, and marginal effects in 
percentage pints in brackets. * and ** denotes significance at ten and five percent level respectively. The 
specifications of all models are as in baseline model presented in Table 4 except as indicated.  
 
                                                 
17 In a “horse race” competition between average achievement and the share of low performing students (using 
present values), average achievement turns out as a “winner”. In a simple logit model where both average 
achievement and the share of low performing students are included, the effect of average achievement is 
significant at ten percent level (the marginal effect is -0.72),  while the effect of the share of low performing 
students becomes clearly insignificant.   19
 
The results for grades given by teachers are very similar to the results above.
 18  Out of 
12 coefficients estimated for average achievement, five are significant at ten percent level 
compared to seven significant effects for examination grades. One of the differences is that 
there are no significant effects of lagged grades given by teachers.
19 On the other hand, the 
effect of the share of low performing students is slightly stronger when teacher grades are 
used instead of examination grades.
 20 
  
Overall, the results are almost qualitatively independent of whether leaded or non-
leaded measures of student performance are used in the model. This indicates that neither a 
bias related to the simultaneity bias of the type indicated above or a measurement error of 
using grades that are not directly related to the student population the next year are large. On 
the other hand, the effects of lagged measures are smaller, which may indicate that this is a 
weaker measure of the student achievement relevant for teacher behavior. 
 
4.2 Sub-samples based on teacher characteristics 
Referring to equation (4), different types of teachers may value non-pecuniary rewards 
differently. In the following we allow for different responses to all explanatory variables 
across teacher types by dividing the full sample into different sub-samples based upon various 
characteristics of the particular teacher. The model specification is equal to the baseline 
model. Table 6 presents the results for student achievement.  
 
                                                 
18 The correlation over time for teacher grades is in the range 0.39-0.44. 
19 In a “horse-race” competition between average examination grades and average grades given by teachers using 
present values in a simple logit model, the effect of examination grades are significant at five percent level (the 
marginal effect is -0.63) while the effect of grades given by teachers is clearly insignificant.  
20 The effect of the other variables in the model are mainly unaffected by the changes in the model specifications 
presented in Table 4. However,  when using leaded and lagged values there are some small changes compared to 
the baseline model, probably because of different samples used (the school years 1998-99 to 2000-01 and 2000-
01 to  2001-02, respectively, instead of the school years 1999-00  to 2001-02). This is in particular true for the 
effects of the different measures of student composition, indicating that these effects are not stable over time.   20
Table 6. The effect of average student performance for different sub-samples. The 
comparison group is staying teachers 
Sub-sample  Moving to a school 
in the same school 
district. 
Moving to a school in 
another school district 
in the same labor 
market region. 
Moving to a school 
in another labor 
market region. 
Moving out of 
public  schools 
Number of 
observations 
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[-0.01] 







Note. The model is estimated by the multinomial logit method. Asymptotic t-values in parentheses, calculated 
based on standard errors corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors, and marginal effects in 
percentage points in brackets. * and ** denotes significance at ten and five percent level respectively. The 
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Out of the 48 estimated coefficients in Table 6, all but three are negative. Student 
achievement seems to have a negative effect on the quit propensity for all types of teachers, 
but there are important quantitative differences across teacher types. These differences should 
be interpreted as a result of different mobility costs. For example, there are stronger effects on 
young teachers (below 40 years of age) than old teachers for all types of quits. The same is 
true for non-married teachers versus married teachers, except that student achievement has a 
stronger effect on the propensity to leave the school sector for married teachers. Regarding 
subsamples based on other teacher characteristics, there are more heterogeneous effects across 
destinations. For example, teachers with school aged children and teachers working in the 
same labor market region as born react stronger on student achievement on moves between 
schools within the labor market region than others, while teachers without school aged 
children and not working in the same labor market region as born react strongest for moves 
out of schools in the labor market region. These results seem reasonable in light of differences 
in mobility costs. Both young teachers, non-married teachers, teachers without school aged 
children and teachers born in a different labor market region are likely to have relatively small 
mobility costs for moves out of the local labor market. Part time working and full time 
working teachers seem to react almost similar to student achievement, while male teachers are 
more responsive when it comes to leaving schools in the local labor market.  
 
4.3. Model specification 
  The multinomial logit model relies on some strong underlying assumptions, for 
example the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives. It may therefore be useful 
to estimate a simpler logit model. In order to make an attempt to distinguish between different 
types of moves, Table 7 presents the result for two different specification of the dependent 
variable. The first model investigates determinants of quitting the present school, which is the 
sum of all quits considered above. The results are close to the average effects across 
destinations in Table 3. For example, an increase in average student achievement by 1.5 
standard deviation decreases the quit propensity with 0.8 percentage points. The second 
model investigates determinants of quitting public schools, focusing on one of the quit types 
discussed above. In this model there are few significant effects, and the effect of student 
achievement is only marginally significant at 10 percent level.  
   22
Table 7.  Logit models for school quits and quits out of education 
Dependent variable  The teacher is not at the same 
school the next school year 
The teacher is not in public schools 
the next school year 
Student performance    
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Additional teacher education hours 
for special needs students per student 





(0.15)   
[0.01] 
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Logarithm to total number of teacher 








The share of uncertified teachers 

















    
Predicted probability  0.10  0.05 
Number of observations  60485  60485 
Note. 60485 observations. The model is estimated by the multinomial logit method. Asymptotic t-values in 
parentheses, calculated based on standard errors corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors, and 
marginal effects in percentage points in brackets. * and ** denotes significance at ten and five percent level 
respectively. In addition to the reported variables, the same teacher and regional variables reported in Appendix 
Table A2, labor market region specific effects and year specific effects are included in the model.  
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So far teachers on leave without pay are regarded as quitters. About 18 percent of the 
observed quits are teachers returning to the same school after one year, mainly related to 
within school district moves and moves out of teaching.
21 However, redefining these kinds of 
moves as staying teachers has very small effects on the results.
22  
  Even though the present analysis includes a large number of school characteristics, no 
direct measure of parental background of the students is included. Information of parental 
background is, however, available for the last year in our sample. Imposing these measures on 
all three years of the sample does not change the results much. By for example including 
these variables in the first logit model of Table 7, the effect of student achievement is slightly 
reduced to -0.66.  
The present analysis also includes a large number of teacher characteristics, but still 
unobserved teacher characteristics, as for example the teachers’ mission to teach low 
performing students, may bias the estimated effects. One way of taking this into account is to 
include fixed teacher effects. Including fixed teacher effects may be problematic, however, 
within a three year long panel because only teachers that move at least once during the 
empirical period can be included in the model. Teachers that do not move will not contribute 
to the log-likelihood. For this reason the sample is reduced by about 86 percent. The results of 
such models are sensitive to which achievement measure that is included. For the measure 
used in our baseline model, there is basically no effect of achievement. Using leaded 
achievement, however, the effect is negatively significant at 5 percent level. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper indicates that teachers tend to quit schools with low student performance. 
This result must be interpreted within a wage setting regime which yields little variation in the 
wages across schools. When teachers are not compensated for working conditions, students 
most in need of good schools and high-quality teachers may be harmed. The effect of high 
teacher turnover on teacher quality, however, depends on the possibility of the schools to 
attract new and competent teachers. We have argued that systematic effects on the quit rate 
are likely to reflect the attractiveness of the schools. In this case, our results indicate that 
reduced student performance makes the school less attractive from the “average” teachers’ 
                                                 
21 For teachers leaving a school for another school in the same school district, another school district in the same 
labor market region, another labor market region, or out of teaching, 12.2, 5.5, 4.7, and 19.2 percent, 
respectively, return to the same school after one year.  
22 The marginal effects of student achievement in the baseline model changes to -0.19, -0.11, -0.16 and -0.21 for 
the four different types of moves, respectively.   24
point of view, reducing the pool of teachers that want to teach at the school. Not only must the 
school hire more of the teachers in the applicant pool, the number of potential matches will 
also be reduced.
23 
This effect is likely to be critical mainly in situations with low teacher supply. When 
the overall supply of well-qualified teachers is relatively low compared to the demand for 
teachers, teachers leaving a school can be hard to replace, in particular when teacher mobility 
is related to factors making the school unattractive. Betts et al. (2000) and Jepsen and Rivkin 
(2002) show that the mandated class size reduction in California in 1996 increased the share 
of less-experienced teachers and teachers who lack a full credential. Most importantly, the 
evidence indicates a substantial teacher movement away from high-poverty schools to low-
poverty schools and from schools serving mainly nonwhite students to schools serving white 
students. Jepsen and Rivkin (2002) argue that this movement in some cases fully offset the 
benefits from smaller classes.  
The importance of a negative influence of student achievement on teacher turnover is 
therefore expected to be more severe in for example the UK experiencing teacher shortages 
(Dolton et al., 2002) than in for example Switzerland with a high teacher supply (Wolter and 
Denzler, 2003). In Norway, the importance of this effect may have been reduced in the 21st 
century as the teacher wage increased and teacher supply improved. An OECD working paper 
argues that there “is a widespread belief that several countries in the OECD area suffer from 
shortages of teachers in particular subject areas, grade levels, or regions of the country” 
(Santiago, 2002 p. 11). To avoid unwanted distributional consequences of low teacher supply, 
one could think of wage setting institutions that compensate teachers serving low-performing 
students. This is an intricate situation, however, because then teacher incentives with respect 
to student performance may become completely wrong. The most reasonable policy change 
given the evidence that rigid wages tends to sort teachers in a harmful way for disadvantage 




                                                 
23 This indicates that there is a negative correlation between teacher turnover and student achievement. In our 
data, the correlation between the share of teachers in permanent position that leave the school and average 
student achievement is -0.06   25
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Appendix Table A1. Descriptive statistics  
 Mean  St.  dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
        
Student performance         
Examination grades      
Average student achievement   -0.05  0.68  -4.77  5.18 
Share of low performing students   0.22  0.12  0  1 
Grades given by teachers      
Average student achievement  3.64  0.27  1.75  5.5 
Share of low performing students  0.16  0.08  0  1 
        
Other school characteristics          
Share of students with special needs  0.07  0.03  0  0.31 
Additional teacher education hours for special needs 
students per student with special needs 
197.12 114.58  0  1900 
Share of minority students   0.06  0.10  0  0.87 
Additional teacher education hours for minority students 
per minority student 
85.69 105.26  0  1900 
Log of  number of teacher education hours per student  4.50  0.61  1.9  6.68 
Number of pupils  271  129.77  3  798 
Log of number of pupils         
Log of pupils squared  30.12  6.18  1.21  44.65 
The share of uncertified teachers employed at school  0.05  0.07  0  1 
Combined schools  0.50  0.50  0  1 
        
Individual characteristics         
Married   0.70  0.46  0  1 
Divorced 0.11  0.31  0  1 
Single 0.20  0.40  0  1 
Working in the same labor market region as born   0.37  0.48  0  1 
Birth region unknown  0.12  0.32  0  1 
Part-time working  0.25  0.43  0  1 
On leave  0.027  0.16  0  1 
Female    0.60  0.49  0  1 
Number of school children (children between 6 and 18 
years) 
0.66 0.94  0  8 
Number of children beyond 6 years  0.24  0.57  0  4 
Age   45.20  9.83  23  60 
Monthly salary  measured in NOK  23663  2583.28  13976.92  35794 
Logarithm to salary         
3 years of higher education (unqualified)  0.03  0.19  0  1 
4 years of higher education   0.75  0.44  0  1 
5 years of higher education   0.17  0.37  0  1 
6 years of higher education   0.05  0.22  0  1 
        
Regional characteristics          
Unemployment-rate in the local government   0.04  0.02  0.01  0.25 
Population in local government  61382.3  126935.60  246  508726 
The share of people living in rural areas   0.30  0.26  0  1 
The share of divorced people between 16 and 66 years  0.10  0.02  0.033  0.147 
The share of immigrants  0.05  0.04  0.002  0.193 
Note. The sample is the school years 1999-2000 to 2001-02, 60485 observations. 
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Appendix Table 2. The effects of individual  and regional characteristics on teacher 
turnover. The comparison group is staying teachers.  
  Moving to a school 
in the same school 
district. 
Moving to a school in 
another school district 
in the same labor 
market region. 
Moving to a school 
in another labor 
market region. 
Moving out of 
public  schools 
Individual teacher characteristics       
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Logarithm to salary  0.72 (1.69)* 
[2.38] 
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The share of people living in rural 
areas 








The share of divorced people between 

















        
Predicted probability  0.03  0.006  0.013  0.05 
Note. 60485 observations. The model is estimated by the multinomial logit method. Asymptotic t-values in 
parentheses, calculated based on standard errors corrected to account for within-school clustering of errors, and 
marginal effects in percentage points in brackets. * and ** denotes significance at ten and five percent level 
respectively. In addition to the reported variables, the variables reported in Table 4, labor market region specific 
effects and year specific effects are included in the model.  CESifo Working Paper Series 
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